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CHAIDEZ V. UNITED STATES –
YOU CAN’T GO HOME AGAIN
ARAM A. GAVOOR* & JUSTIN M. ORLOSKY**
ABSTRACT
This article examines a 2013 Supreme Court decision, Chaidez v.
United States, in which the Court declined to apply retroactively another
recent decision, Padilla v. Kentucky. To many observers, Chaidez
appears to be a discrete departure from previous Sixth Amendment right to
counsel jurisprudence. On a personal level, noncitizens who pled guilty to
a crime without being apprised of the plea’s removal risks are now unable
to seek redress under Padilla and return to their homes in the United
States. This article examines relevant Sixth Amendment and retroactivity
jurisprudence and proposes an explanation for the Court’s apparent aboutface.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Until relatively recently, federal immigration law lacked clarity
regarding the removal of noncitizens.1 In the past, an immigrant who
committed a removable offense would not inevitably be removed in
practice.2 In the mid-1990s, however, Congress passed two laws affecting criminal procedure for noncitizens.3 Now, a noncitizen who commits an “aggravated felony” will almost inevitably be removed from the
* Professorial Lecturer of Law, The George Washington University Law School;
former trial and appellate attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division, Office of
Immigration Litigation U.S. Department of Justice; Adjunct Professor of Law, The George
Washington University Law School; LL.M., Georgetown University Law Center; J.D., The
George Washington University Law School; B.A., University of Michigan. The views
expressed herein are the author’s own and do not reflect the views of the United States or
any federal government agency.
** Candidate for Juris Doctor, The George Washington University Law School,
May 2015; A.B., Harvard College, 2009.
1. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 369 (2010).
2. See Immigration Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 64-301, § 19, 39 Stat. 874, 889–90.
3. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 5, 104 Stat. 4978, 5050 (eliminating judicial discretion in the deportation process); Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 240B, 110 Stat.
3009-546, 3009-596 (eliminating Attorney General discretion with a few exceptions).
Aggravated felons remain a top priority for removal in the Obama Administration. Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Thomas S.
Winkowski, Acting Director, U.S. Immig. & Customs Enforcement, et al. 3 (Nov. 20,
2014), available at http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_
prosecutorial_discretion.pdf (discussing “Policies for the Apprehension, Detention and
Removal of Undocumented Immigrants” and classifying “aliens “convicted of an ‘aggravated felony[ ]’ . . .” in “Priority 1” of “Civil Immigration Enforcement Priorities”).
231
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United States.4 As a result, many citizens who pled guilty to criminal
charges were subsequently removed. Some sought to challenge their
original guilty pleas, arguing that counsel provided constitutionally
deficient assistance by failing to apprise them of a guilty plea’s removal
risks.5
The Supreme Court addressed this issue in Padilla v. Kentucky,6
whether noncitizens may collaterally challenge their guilty pleas after
final judgment by alleging constitutionally deficient counsel.7 The
Padilla Court held that a noncitizen receives constitutionally deficient
assistance under the Sixth Amendment when such counsel fails to provide the noncitizen with information regarding the consequences of a
guilty plea for removal.8 Following Padilla, a noncitizen may challenge
a guilty plea that results in removal if counsel did not advise him of the
removal risks of entering such a plea during the plea process.9
In Chaidez v. United States,10 decided in February 2013, the
Supreme Court held that Padilla does not retroactively apply to cases
made final before Padilla was decided in 2010.11 The Court’s decision
is surprising because the Padilla opinion and prior Sixth Amendment
jurisprudence indicate that the Padilla decision would apply retroactively.12 Yet, even a brief consideration of the practical consequences of
retroactive application of Padilla helps to elucidate the Court’s decision. The Supreme Court engaged in judicial revision to avert a quagmire in government whereby a consequent flood of litigation would
have swamped already heavily burdened courts and further depleted
public coffers.13 Since relevant Sixth Amendment jurisprudence provided scant support for the Court’s decision,14 the majority defended its
opinion by elevating a mere rhetorical counterargument to a substan-

4. See Padilla, 559 U.S. at 364–65 (describing removal as a “practically inevitable”
result upon conviction of certain crimes).
5. See, e.g., United States v. Kwan, 407 F.3d 1005 (9th Cir. 2005); Padilla, 559 U.S.
356. In Padilla, the Court considered it particularly relevant that following IIRIRA, deportation would be “nearly an automatic result” for many crimes and thus counsel could
more easily advise on questions of removal by consulting the relevant statue. See Padilla,
559 U.S. at 366.
6. 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
7. Id. at 360.
8. See id. at 374. The Supreme Court declined to distinguish “direct” and “collateral” consequences of a guilty plea in the context of removal. See id. at 365.
9. See id. at 365 (defining the scope of constitutionally “reasonable professional
assistance” to require affirmative statements about the consequences of a guilty plea for
deportation (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984)).
10. 133 S. Ct. 1103.
11. Id. at 1113.
12. See generally, Padilla, 559 U.S. 356; INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001); Lewis v.
Johnson, 359 F.3d 646 (3d Cir. 2004); Commonwealth v. Clarke, 949 N.E.2d 892 (Mass.
2011).
13. See infra Part III.B.
14. See infra Part III.A.
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tive holding.15 Hence, the Court made the right decision but for the
wrong (purported) reasons.
II.

BACKGROUND

In 1977, Roselva Chaidez, a native of Mexico, became a lawful permanent resident in the United States.16 She was indicted for mail fraud
in 2003.17 Following the advice of counsel, Ms. Chaidez pled guilty and
received a sentence of four years’ probation.18 Five years later, the government initiated removal proceedings against her after she revealed
her guilty plea in an application for naturalization.19 Government officials sought her removal because her criminal conviction rendered her
removable from the United States as an aggravated felon under immigration law.20 In January 2010, Ms. Chaidez filed a motion for a writ of
coram nobis,21 arguing that her counsel was constitutionally deficient
because she was not informed that a guilty plea could result in
removal.22 While her motion was pending before the district court, the
Supreme Court decided Padilla.23
A.

The District Court Applied Padilla Retroactively By Adopting Strickland

As a result of the Supreme Court’s decision in Padilla, the district
court needed to resolve the issue of whether the case holding would
apply retroactively to Ms. Chaidez’s motion.24 Courts utilize a Teague
analysis to determine the retroactivity of criminal procedure laws.25
Specifically, a “constitutional rule of criminal procedure applies to all
cases on direct and collateral review if it is not a new rule, but rather an
old rule applied to new facts.”26 The district court held that Padilla
“did not announce a new rule for Teague purposes” and thus its precedent controlled.27 The district court reasoned that Padilla was merely
an ordinary application of Strickland v. Washington,28 where the
15. See The Supreme Court, 2012 Term—Leading Cases: Chaidez v. United States, 127
HARV. L. REV. 238, 245–47 (2013) [hereinafter The Supreme Court, 2012 Term: Chaidez v.
United States]
16. Chaidez v. United States, 655 F.3d 684, 686 (7th Cir. 2011).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. See Form N-400: Application for Naturalization, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., U.S.
Citizenship & Immig. Servs., available at http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/files/
form/n-400.pdf.
20. See Chaidez, 655 F.3d at 686. See also 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i) (2013).
21. A writ of coram nobis provides a means to collaterally attack the criminal conviction of a person who is not “in custody” and therefore cannot seek relief under a writ of
habeas corpus. See Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1106 (2013).
22. Chaidez, 655 F.3d at 686.
23. Id.
24. United States v. Chaidez, 730 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Ill. 2010).
25. See Chaidez, 655 F.3d at 688 (citing Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989)).
26. Id.; see Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 416 (2007).
27. Chaidez, 730 F. Supp. 2d at 904 (cited in Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct.
1103, 1106 (2013)).
28. Id. Under Strickland, the Court engages in a two-pronged analysis. First, the
Court considers whether counsel’s representation “fell below an objective standard of
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Supreme Court held that counsel failed to satisfy reasonable professional standards by failing to present character and emotional evidence
at a sentencing hearing, and thus was constitutionally deficient.29 On
the facts, the judge found counsel to be deficient, causing prejudice.30
Accordingly, the district court granted Ms. Chaidez’s petition, vacating
her conviction.31
B.

The Seventh Circuit’s Reversal On Precedential Disagreement Grounds

On appeal, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed in a split
panel.32 Judge Flaum, joined by Judge Bauer, determined the “sole
issue” to be whether Padilla established a new constitutional rule of
criminal procedure.33 Teague dictates that new rules typically do not
apply retroactively.34 And a rule is new if it was not “dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s conviction became final.”35
Whether Padilla was a new rule depends on whether its decision was
“susceptible to debate among reasonable minds.”36 Thus the pertinent
inquiry is “whether a . . . court considering [Chaidez’s] claim at the
time [her] conviction became final – pre-Padilla – would have felt compelled by existing precedent to conclude that [Padilla] was required by
the Constitution.”37 To support its decision, the Seventh Circuit panel
relied on the lack of unanimity in the Padilla opinion,38 and the consensus among lower courts that “collateral” issues were not subject to
Sixth Amendment protections under the right to counsel.39
reasonableness.” Strickland v. United States, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). Second, the
Court considers whether “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694.
29. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 366 (2010).
30. Chaidez, 655 F.3d at 686.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 694.
33. Id. at 688.
34. Id. (“[A] new rule applies retroactively on collateral review if (1) it is substantive
or (2) it is a ‘watershed rul[e] of criminal procedure’ implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding.’ ” (citing Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S.
406, 416 (2007)). Chaidez did not allege that either of these Teague exceptions applied to
her petition. Id.
35. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989) (emphasis omitted).
36. Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 415 (1990) (cited in Chaidez, 655 F.3d at 688).
37. Chaidez, 655 F.3d at 689 (quoting Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 488 (1990))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
38. Chaidez, 655 F.3d at 689 (citing Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 414 (2004) for the
proposition that a lack of unanimity among Justices suggests that a case announces a new
rule). In Padilla, Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer and Sotomayor joined in a plurality
opinion while Justices Alito and Roberts delivered a concurring opinion; Justices Scalia
and Thomas dissented. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 359 (2010).
39. Chaidez, 655 F.3d at 689 (citing Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 415 (1990) for
the proposition that differing positions among lower courts suggests that a case
announces a new rule); Padilla, 559 U.S. at 375–76 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment)
(“Until today, the longstanding and unanimous position of the federal courts was that
reasonable defense counsel generally need only advise a client about the direct consequences of a criminal conviction,” not collateral consequences of conviction, such as
deportation).
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And yet, the panel recognized that applying “Strickland to unique
facts generally will not produce a new rule.”40 The court distinguished
Padilla as a “rare exception” to the proposition in Williams v. West that
applications of new facts to an old rule typically does not create a new
rule.41 The court construed Padilla as “sufficiently novel to qualify as a
new rule.”42 Moreover, the court relied on language in Padilla requiring counsel to “advise a noncitizen client that pending criminal charges
may carry a risk of adverse immigration consequences” when “the law is
not succinct and straightforward.”43 When the consequences of a guilty
plea are “truly clear,” however, counsel must “give correct advice.”44
The court found this language to be so “nuanced” that it could not
have been dictated by existing precedent.45 As a result, the court held
that Padilla was a new rule under the Teague retroactivity analysis and
remanded the case.46 Judge Williams dissented, arguing that professional norms mandated counsel to advise on potential risks of removal,
while noting that the Padilla court explicitly rejected the commonly
accepted distinction between direct and collateral consequences.47
C.

The Supreme Court Affirmed the Appeals Court

The Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed the Seventh
Circuit’s decision.48 Writing for the Court, Justice Kagan began with
the proposition that “apply[ing] a general standard to the kind of factual circumstances it was meant to address” rarely will result in a new
rule under Teague.49 For a rule of criminal procedure to be new and
thus retroactive for Teague purposes, it must be novel.50 A rule is
novel—and thus new under Teague—if it was not “apparent to all reasonable jurists” before establishment.51
40. Chaidez, 655 F.3d at 692. See also Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 308 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (“If the rule in question is one which of necessity
requires a case-by-case examination of the evidence, then we can tolerate a number of
specific applications without saying that those applications themselves create a new
rule.”).
41. Chaidez, 655 F.3d at 692 (“ ‘Where the beginning point is a rule of . . . general
application, . . . it will be the infrequent case that yields a result so novel that it forges a
new rule, one not dictated by precedent.’ ”) (quoting Wright, 505 U.S. at 309 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in the judgment)).
42. Chaidez, 655 at 693.
43. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 369 (cited in Chaidez, 655 F.3d at 693).
44. Id.
45. Chaidez, 655 F.3d at 693 (citing Padilla, 559 U.S. at 369).
46. Id. at 694.
47. Id. at 694, 697 (Williams, J., dissenting).
48. Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1107 (2013).
49. Id. at 1107. See also Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 309 (1992); Williams v. Taylor,
529 U.S. 362, 391 (2001).
50. Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1107 (“[G]arden-variety applications of the test in Strickland . . . for assessing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel do not produce new
rules.”); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989) (“[A] case announces a new rule if the
result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s conviction
became final.”).
51. Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1107 (citing Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 527
(1997)).
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Instead of relying on language in Padilla linking counsel’s duty to
advise with the clarity of immigration law, as the Seventh Circuit
opined,52 the majority found novelty in the threshold question of
whether removal was a collateral issue outside the scope of the Sixth
Amendment.53 Padilla decided this preliminary question of scope, an
issue never before decided,54 holding that collateral removal claims satisfied Sixth Amendment requirements.55 Only afterwards did the
Court engage in a Strickland analysis on the merits to determine
whether counsel was constitutionally deficient.56
The majority further argued that Padilla was a new rule under
Teague because no Supreme Court precedent “dictated” the result.57
Like the Seventh Circuit, the Court considered it significant that before
Padilla the vast majority of lower courts did not extend Sixth Amendment protections to require that counsel inform clients of a guilty
plea’s collateral consequences, including removal.58 Before Padilla,
only two state courts held that the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel
extended to advice about a guilty plea’s collateral consequences.59
Hence, the majority upheld the ruling of the Seventh Circuit, holding
Padilla to be a new rule under Teague.60 As a result, Chaidez, and other
cases final on direct review before Padilla, may not benefit from the
Padilla Court’s ruling.61
Believing that the Sixth Amendment ensures the right to counsel
only for direct consequences of criminal proceedings, Justice Thomas
wrote a concurring opinion.62 He rejected the Court’s Padilla holding,
52. Chaidez, 655 F.3d at 693.
53. Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1108 (“[P]rior to asking how the Strickland test applied
[(did this attorney act unreasonably?)], Padilla asked whether the Strickland test applied
[(should we even evaluate if this attorney acted unreasonably?)].”).
54. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 365 (2010) (cited in Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at
1112).
55. Padilla, 559 at 365 (“We . . . have never applied a distinction between direct and
collateral consequences to define the scope of constitutionally ‘reasonable professional
assistance’ required under Strickland . . . . Whether that distinction is appropriate is a
question we need not consider in this case because of the unique nature of deportation.”)
(citations omitted). See also Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1112 (“Even in Padilla we did not eschew
the direct-collateral divide across the board.”).
56. See Chaidez, 133 S. Ct at 1108. Under Strickland, “[a] defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must show (1) that counsel’s representation ‘fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,’ and (2) that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced
the defendant.” Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 476–77 (2000) (quoting Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984)).
57. See Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1110 (citing Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989)).
In Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985), the Court explicitly left open whether advice of
counsel concerning collateral consequences must satisfy the Sixth Amendment. See
Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1108.
58. Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1109.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1113. See also Gabriel J. Chin & Richard W. Holmes, Jr., Effective Assistance
of Counsel and the Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 697, 706 (2002) (recognizing the exclusion of advice about collateral consequences from the Sixth Amendment’s scope as one of “the most widely recognized rules of American law”).
61. See Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1113.
62. Id.
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namely that the Sixth Amendment mandates counsel to provide advice
regarding collateral consequences of a guilty plea, including removal.63
Considering Padilla to have been wrongly decided, Justice Thomas concluded that the entire Teague analysis was unnecessary.64 Accordingly,
he concurred only in the judgment.65 Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Ginsburg, dissented.66 The dissent echoed the district court opinion, arguing that Padilla was not a new rule but rather a “garden-variety
application[ ] of . . . Strickland . . . .”67 To establish ineffective assistance
of counsel under Strickland, a defendant first must demonstrate that
counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of “reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.”68 And for over a decade,
professional norms have coalesced around the practice of informing
clients about the removal risks of a guilty plea.69 As a result, Padilla was
not novel, and its edict did not create a new law because it was entirely
consistent with professional standards at the time the case was decided.70
Additionally, the dissent closely read a line of recent lower court
cases holding that affirmative misstatements about the removal risks of
a guilty plea constituted deficient performance under Strickland.71 The
Supreme Court adopted this view in INS v. St. Cyr.72 The St. Cyr Court
emphasized the ABA’s ethical standards for criminal defense attorneys,
including remaining apprised about removal risks, as a “basic rule of
professional conduct.”73 According to the dissent, the Court’s general
approval of ABA ethical standards regarding affirmative misstatements,
coupled with lower court decisions, affirmed in St. Cyr, holding that
affirmative misstatements about removal risks were covered by the Sixth
Amendment, “foreshadowed” Padilla, thus making its decision less than
novel.74 According to Justice Sotomayor, Padilla was not a discrete shift
63. Id. at 1114 (“[T]here is no basis in text or in principle to expand the reach of
this guarantee to guidance concerning the collateral consequences of a guilty plea.”)
(citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
68. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984).
69. Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1116–17, n.3 (citing 3 ABA Protect on Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to Pleas of Guilty § 3.2(b), Commentary, p.71 (App. Draft
1968)); INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 323, n.50 (2001) (“competent defense counsel”
would inform his client about the deportation consequences of a guilty plea).
70. Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1114.
71. Id. at 1118 (citing United States v. Couto, 311 F.3d 179, 188 (2d Cir. 2002);
United States v. Kwan, 407 F.3d 1005, 1015 (9th Cir. 2005)).
72. 533 U.S. 289 (2001).
73. United States v. Kwan, 407 F.3d 1005, 1016 (9th Cir. 2005) (interpreting INS v.
St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001)).
74. Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1119. The majority distinguishes between affirmative misstatements and omissions regarding collateral consequences of a guilty plea. Id. at 1113.
The dissent notes, however, that a similar argument was rejected in Padilla and that such a
categorical distinction is inconsistent with Strickland’s requirement of a case-by-case assessment of counsel’s performance. Id. at 1119–20.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDE\29-1\NDE107.txt

238

unknown

Seq: 8

20-APR-15

NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY

9:34

[Vol. 29

in Sixth Amendment right to counsel jurisprudence, as the majority
argued.75
Finally, the dissent criticized the majority opinion as “paradoxical.”76 The majority emphasized that Padilla established that the collateral consequences of a guilty plea, including removal, were covered by
the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel.77 Justice Stevens in Padilla,
however, declined to distinguish “direct” and “collateral” consequences,78 eschewing the distinction as “irrelevant” for the purposes of
determining the duty of counsel to advise upon removal risks during
the plea process.79
III.
A.

DISCUSSION

Strickland Has Never Announced a “New Rule” Under Teague

“[T]he Sixth Amendment right to counsel exists, and is needed, in
order to protect the fundamental right to a fair trial.”80 The Strickland
Court established a two-part standard to evaluate ineffective assistance
of counsel claims across the “variety of circumstances” that may arise.81
According to this “now-familiar test[, a] defendant claiming ineffective
assistance of counsel must show (1) that counsel’s representation fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) that counsel’s
deficient performance prejudiced the defendant.”82 In the first prong,
the Court declined to adopt “detailed guidelines for representation,”
instead favoring a more flexible reasonableness standard.83 The Court
explained: “The proper measure of attorney performance remains simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.”84 Counsel
has “duties to consult with the defendant on important decisions and to
keep the defendant informed of important developments in the course
of the prosecution.”85 Accordingly, Strickland applies to all ineffective
assistance claims, including those arising during the plea process.86
In Teague v. Lane,87 the Court announced that “[r]etroactivity is . . .
a threshold question, for, once a new rule is applied to the defendant in
75. Id. at 1120.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1108.
78. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 365 (2010) (“Whether that distinction is
appropriate is a question we need not consider in this case because of the unique nature
of deportation.”).
79. Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1117.
80. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S 668, 684 (1984).
81. Id. at 689.
82. Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 476–77 (2000) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S.
at 688) (internal quotation marks omitted).
83. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. (“No particular set of detailed rules for counsel’s
conduct can satisfactorily take account of the variety of circumstances faced by defense
counsel or the range of legitimate decisions regarding how best to represent a criminal
defendant.”). Id. at 688–89.
84. Id. at 688.
85. Id.
86. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985).
87. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
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the case announcing the rule, evenhanded justice requires that it be
applied retroactively to all who are similarly situated.”88 In general, a
rule is “new” when it “breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation
on the States or the Federal Government,”89 or, alternatively, when it
was not “dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s conviction became final.”90 A rule is “old” if a “court considering the
defendant’s claim at the time his conviction became final would have
felt compelled by existing precedent to conclude that the rule he seeks
was required by the Constitution.”91 Both “old” and “new” rules apply
on direct review,92 but only “old” rules typically apply retroactively in
cases on collateral review.93 Post-Teague decisions confirmed that application of a general rule does not typically create a “new” rule.94
Indeed, Justice Kennedy later recalled “[w]here the beginning point is
a rule of . . . general application, a rule designed for the specific purpose of evaluating a myriad of factual contexts, it will be the infrequent
case that yields a result so novel that it forges a new rule, one not dictated by precedent.”95
It is unprecedented for the Court to hold that a Strickland analysis
created a new rule under Teague.96 In Roe v. Flores-Ortega,97 for instance,
a state prisoner sought habeas relief, claiming ineffective assistance of
counsel because his attorney failed to apprise him of the right to
appeal.98 The Court considered the argument that imposing such a
88. Id. at 300.
89. Id. at 301.
90. Id.
91. United States v. Chang Hong, 671 F.3d 1147, 1153 (10th Cir. 2011) (quoting
O’Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151, 156 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted).
92. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 303; see also Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103
(2013). “Teague stated two exceptions: [W]atershed rules of criminal procedure and rules
placing conduct beyond the power of the [government] to proscribe apply on collateral
review, even if novel.” Id. at 1107, n.3 (internal quotation marks omitted). Chaidez, however, did not allege that either exception was relevant to her case. Id.
93. See Chang Hong, 671 F.3d at 1153. In Teague, the Court provided an example of
a decision that did not announce a new rule but instead was dictated by existing precedent: Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (1985). Teague, 489 U.S. at 307. Francis involved an
application of Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979), in which the Court held that
due process is violated if jury instructions “had the effect of relieving the State of the
burden of proof” regarding mens rea. Teague, 489 U.S. at 521. The majority in Francis
rejected the dissent’s distinction between mandatory and permissive presumptions of
mens rea in the two cases as insufficient to qualify the general “rule of Sandstrom and the
wellspring due process principle from which it was drawn.” Francis, 471 U.S. at 326.
94. See Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 229 (1992) (holding that despite “differences
in the use of aggravating factors under the Mississippi capital sentencing system and their
use in the Georgia system in Godfrey [v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980)],” Clemons [v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738 (1989)] did not establish a “new rule” because “those differences could
not have been considered a basis for denying relief in light of precedent existing at the
time petitioner’s sentence became final.”).
95. Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 309 (1992) (opinion concurring in the
judgment).
96. See Chaidez, 133 S. Ct at 1114–15 (“[The Supreme Court] ha[s] never found that
an application of Strickland resulted in a new rule.”) (citation omitted).
97. 528 U.S. 470 (2000).
98. Id. at 474.
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duty on defense counsel was barred by Teague.99 However, the Court
rejected this argument, holding that counsel has a duty to consult with
a defendant about the possibility of appeal when there is reason to
believe either “(1) that a rational defendant would want to appeal . . .
or (2) that this particular defendant reasonably demonstrated to counsel that he was interested in appealing.”100 The Court remanded the
case with instructions to apply “the circumstance-specific reasonableness inquiry required by Strickland . . . .”101
In the context of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), the Court has similarly reinforced
that application of Strickland to new circumstances does not create a
“new rule.” Section 2254(d) prohibits habeas relief unless a state court
decision involved an “unreasonable application of clearly established
Federal law.”102 In Wiggins v. Smith,103 for instance, the Court considered whether another case, Williams v. Taylor,104 announced a “new
rule” from its application of Strickland.105 Williams involved counsel’s
failure to present mitigating evidence at sentencing,106 whereas Strickland involved counsel’s failure to present character and emotional evidence.107 The Wiggins Court announced that it “made no new law in
resolving [Williams’] ineffectiveness claim,” as its decision merely
applied Strickland to a new set of facts.108
B.

Prudential Concerns Motivated the Chaidez Court

It is particularly surprising that the Chaidez Court declined to apply
retroactively the decision in Padilla. Language in the Padilla opinion
strongly suggests that it would apply retroactively. In fact, the Court
dismissed concerns that Padilla would spawn a “floodgate” of new litigation.109 And the Court had never held that a Strickland application created a new rule under Teague.110 Padilla appeared to be a
99. Id. at 475 (“The judge concluded, however, that Stearns announced a new rule
that could not be applied retroactively on collateral review to respondent’s case. See
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S. Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989). Thus, the Magistrate Judge recommended that the habeas petition be denied.”).
100. Id. at 480.
101. Id. at 478. On remand, the Ninth Circuit applied Strickland and granted habeas
relief. Flores-Ortega v. Roe, 39 F.App’x 604 (9th Cir. 2002).
102. 28 U.S.C. § 22254(d)(1) (1996). See also Schwab v. Crosby, 451 F.3d 1308,
1323 (11th Cir. 2006) (“The content of the § 2254(d) unreasonable application test is
drawn in large part from the Teague v. Lane nonretroactivity doctrine and the decisions
explicating it.”) (citation omitted).
103. 539 U.S. 510 (2003).
104. 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
105. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 512.
106. Williams, 529 U.S. at 372.
107. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 673 (1984).
108. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 542 (internal quotation marks omitted). See also Rompilla
v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005).
109. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 372 (2010) (“It seems unlikely that our decision today will have a significant effect on those convictions already obtained as the result
of plea bargains.”).
110. See Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1114–15 (2013) (“[The Supreme
Court] ha[s] never found that an application of Strickland resulted in a new rule.”).
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straightforward application of Strickland, reflecting gradual changes in
professional standards.111
Why did the Court engage in apparent judicial “revision”?112 First,
practical concerns favor prospectively limiting Padilla. Petitions for a
writ of coram nobis are not limited by a statute of limitations because
such relief emerges from equitable doctrine.113 Consequently, there is
a potential for a “floodgate” of litigation over collateral deportation
issues that could span decades. The principal check on the availability
of the writ of coram nobis is laches.114 Since Padilla is a recent decision, it
is doubtful that claims like Chaidez would be barred due to unreasonable delay—at least for the near future.115 Actual records, if ever kept,
may no longer be available while potential witnesses are more likely to
have forgotten relevant details. Even if a “floodgate” of litigation did
not materialize, cases that did arise would be exceedingly difficult for
courts to decide given the time since final judgment.116
Next, retroactive application of Padilla would be burdensome for
the US government. Such a decision would have created a logistical
ordeal, involving an array of federal agencies, including the US Department of Homeland Security,117 Federal Bureau of Investigation,118 and
the Department of Justice.119 Given the recent government shutdown
in 2013 and dwindling budgets, it is doubtful that federal agencies
could actually accommodate the added requirements that retroactive
application of Padilla would impose.
Finally, retroactive application of Padilla would be particularly
unfair to attorneys. Before Padilla, nearly all state and lower federal
courts held, pursuant to the Sixth Amendment, that attorneys were not
required to provide evidence of collateral consequences of plea agreements, including removal.120 Although the ABA considered it “good
practice” for attorneys to inform clients of the immigration conse111. See id. at 1114 (“Strickland’s reasonableness prong therefore takes its content
from the standards by which lawyers judge their professional obligations, and those standards are subject to change.”) (citations omitted). See also The Supreme Court, 2012 Term:
Chaidez v. United States, supra note 15, at 245–47.
112. See Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1117.
113. See Chaidez v. United States, 655 F.3d 684, 686 (7th Cir. 2011). The government initiated deportation proceedings five years after her guilty plea, after which she
filed a petition for a writ of coram nobis. See also id. at 687 (“The [w]rit [of coram nobis] is
an extraordinary remedy.”).
114. See, e.g., United States v. Riedl, 496 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 2007); Craven v. United
States, 26 F. App’x 417 (6th Cir. 2001).
115. See Blanton v. United States, 94 F.3d 227, 235 (6th Cir. 1996).
116. It is perhaps noteworthy that Justice Kagan, who wrote the majority opinion in
Chaidez, was the Solicitor General of the United States.
117. See Homeland Security Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
118. See, e.g., Policy Manual: Vol. 12, Part B, Ch. 2, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIG. SERV.
(Oct. 28, 2014), http://www.uscis.gov/policymanual/HTML/PolicyManual-Volume12PartB-Chapter2.html (describing the role of the FBI in criminal record background
checks for certain immigration purposes).
119. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (2006).
120. See Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1109 (2013).
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quences of a plea agreement,121 such recommendations were not the
law.122 Although the St. Cyr Court explicitly endorsed such ABA recommendations, it did not actually change the black-letter law, which limited the duty of attorneys to inform clients of the “direct” consequences
of a guilty plea.123 Although informing clients about removal may have
been wise, it was not required.124 Before Padilla, counsel had a strong
incentive to remain silent about collateral consequences because
affirmative misstatements could risk Strickland liability.125 Hence,
extending Padilla retroactively would force criminal defense attorneys
to appear in court to answer for actions in accord with the law at that
time.
IV.

CONCLUSION

At first, the Chaidez decision is perplexing. Language in the Padilla
opinion indicates that the Court anticipated its retroactive application.126 To justify this about face, the Court in Chaidez cites the novelty
of a distinction that it previously regarded as irrelevant in Padilla.127
Indeed, the dissent in Chaidez is being less than bombastic when
describing the majority’s reasoning as “paradoxical.”128 Although the
majority’s reasoning is somewhat tenuous, misconstruing the Padilla
opinion’s rhetorical structure,129 its motivations are far less clouded.
The Chaidez Court reaches a sensible (although unsupported) decision,
balancing the desire to address the harsh consequences of removal
against the fear of judicial backlash from reopening cases that would be
particularly difficult to adjudicate. The end seems to have justified the
means.

121. See id. at 1117 (citing 3 ABA Protect on Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to Pleas of Guilty § 3.2(b), Commentary, p.71 (App. Draft 1968)).
122. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 364–74 (2010).
123. See id.
124. See id.
125. See The Supreme Court, 2012 Term: Chaidez v. United States, supra note 15, at
245–47; Jenny Roberts, Ignorance Is Effectively Bliss: Collateral Consequences, Silence, and Misinformation in the Guilty-Plea Process, 95 IOWA L. REV. 119, 123–24 (2009).
126. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 369–71.
127. Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1108 (2013). See also The Supreme
Court, 2012 Term: Chaidez v. United States, supra note 15, at 245–47.
128. See Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1120.
129. See The Supreme Court, 2012 Term: Chaidez v. United States, supra note 15, at
245–47.

